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ABSTRACT
The role of a political leader has always been important for understanding both domestic and
world politics. The most significant historical events are usually associated in our minds with the
images of the people who were directly involved and who were in charge of the most crucial
decisions at that particular moment in time. Thus, analyzing the American Civil War, we always
mention the great role and the achievements of Abraham Lincoln as the president of the United
States. We cannot forget about the actions of such charismatic leaders as Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin,
Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt when we think about the brutal events and the
outcome of the World War II. Or, for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis and its peaceful solution
went down in history highlighting roles of John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in the tense
negotiations during the confrontation.
This thesis is built as a single-case study discovering the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev
as a leader and his role in the peaceful solution of the Cold War. It shows how particular social and
political-economic backgrounds shaped certain features of his character, and how those features
influenced his political decisions later on. Mikhail Gorbachev, the first and the last President of the
USSR, is a perfect example of a leader who acted in a new unique historical situation without much
of theoretical guidance from the past. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union started to shift from
socialism towards a new political regime that entitled significant changes in international politics.

Table of Contents
I.

Introduction

II.

Chapter 1. Review of the Literature

III.

Chapter 2. Case Study
1.

Early Years

2.

Student Years and Marriage

3.

Early Career as a Young Politician

4.

Back to Moscow

5.

Domestic Reforms. Chernobyl Disaster

6.

The Washington Summit

7.

Reforms in International Affairs

8.

Afghanistan

9.

The Berlin Wall

10.

The Malta Summit

11.

Collapse of the USSR

12.

Main Actors of the Cold War Ending

13.

Gorbachev’s Personality

IV. Conclusion

There is nothing more difficult to take in hand,
More perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success,
Than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

Niccolo Machiavelli.

INTRODUCTION
The role of a political leader has always been important for understanding both domestic
and world politics. The most significant historical events are usually associated in our minds with
the images of the people who were directly involved and who were in charge of the most crucial
decisions at that particular moment in time. Thus, analyzing the American Civil War, we always
mention the great role and the achievements of Abraham Lincoln as the president of the United
States. We cannot forget about the actions of such charismatic leaders as Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin,
Winston Churchill, and Franklin D. Roosevelt when we think about the brutal events and the
outcome of the World War II. Or, for example, the Cuban Missile Crisis and its peaceful solution
went down in history highlighting roles of John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev in the tense
negotiations during the confrontation.
But to what degree is a leader (formal or informal) responsible for a course of events?
Would every person with certain leadership characteristics make the same decisions in a particular
situation? How long would World War II have lasted and what would have been the outcome if we
had a different leader in the USSR or in the United States? Would the outcome of the Cuban Missile
Crisis been different if we had somebody like George W. Bush instead of John F. Kennedy as
president at that time? If Stalin had been in the place of Nikita Khrushchev at that time, would the
decision-making been any different? Probably it would have ended differently but we will never
know, we can only guess. But this kind of discussion raises the issue of a political leader’s
importance in international affairs and makes us reassess past and contemporary political events
from a more psychological personality-oriented angle.
The role of personality in political events had not been seriously researched until very
recently when political psychology became a scientific movement. Political psychology was formed
as a merger between social psychology, a sphere that mainly examines behavior of people in groups,
and political science. This new field of study focuses on the subjective side of political events and,

according to Jeanne Knutson, professor of political science and social psychology, the subject of
political psychology is the psychological component in political behavior of a person, social group
and/or a nation. Examining those subjects would allow us to explain politics by means of
psychology.1
While there is some debate about the usefulness of psychology in political science, there is
no general agreement about the role of personality in politics. According to Russian academic
Evgeni B. Shestopal,2 there are two major opinions on the subject today. The first group of scientists
puts personality as the most important factor in political affairs. Actual political views of a person
are less important within this approach. The role of a leader is described based on his/her personal
characteristics, usually the stronger sides, such as leadership talents, social skills, abilities,
knowledge, level of authority, political influence, etc. There are researchers who also agree with the
importance of a personality in politics, but they focus more on a leader’s weaker sides, such as
complex pathologies and other psychological difficulties, as the main factor in decision-making
process. In this manner, James D. Barber3 offers the idea that an inferiority complex caused by
psychological trauma in childhood, combined with attempts to compensate for it, can mobilize a
person for greater achievements in the future. These achievements can be incomparable to the
successes of his/her more fortunate peers.
The second approach, in contrast, tends to neglect the role of a leader in politics. There are
several theoretical explanations to this idea. First, some political scientists believe that social factors
play dominant roles and mainly determine the leader’s behavior. Second, there are Marxist theorists
who say that economic factors influence politics the most. Third, there is also functionalist
1

Knutson J., Handbook of political psychology, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. 1973.

2

Shestopal E. B., Political Psychology: textbook, Moscow: Infra-M, 2002.

3

James David Barber (1930-2004) – prominent political scientist and expert in American presidential

character, who predicted the downfall of Richard M. Nixon several years before it actually happened.

movement that focuses on the components of the political system (such as parties, organizations,
factions) as its main determinants. Finally, there are political scientists who agree to explore some
certain components of personality but do not consider a leader as a factor of influence on political
life. As Alex Inkeles, professor of sociology at Stanford University, pointed out, the individual
characteristics of a person are suppressed in international politics. Therefore, we should study mass
patterns, such as group processes, rather than individual characteristics of a leader.4 The main idea
that unites all these views is that a personality is not the main focal point as an explanation of events
in politics.

This thesis is built within the first theoretical approach where psychological characteristics
of a leader and his/her role are believed to be very important in understanding and analyzing the
world of high-level politics. The purpose of this research is to show how individual characteristics
of a person can influence political behavior and major decisions. The example of Mikhail
Gorbachev and analysis of his social and political background shows the role he played in the
peaceful solution of the Cold War.
This thesis aims to answer the following three questions:
-

What is the current condition of political psychology as a science? What are

the major assumptions regarding the role of personality in politics?
-

What is the practical importance of research in the field of political

psychology and how is it applicable to the study of international relations?
-

What are the major biological factors that can define success of failure in

political career?

4

Inkeles, Alex, Sociology and Psychology. In: Sigmund Koch ed. Psychology: A Study of a Science. New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1963, p. 354.

-

What are the major approaches in exploring the personality of a political

leader?
Answers to the afore mentioned questions will help me prove or disprove the hypothesis,
namely that in-depth analysis of a political leader would allow us to understand, predict, and,
possibly, prevent undesirable behavior of high-level officials. Based on the analysis of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s personality and his decisions, I assert that Gorbachev’s personality was critical in
bringing the Cold War to the peaceful solution.

This thesis is built as a single-case study discovering the personality of Mikhail Gorbachev
as a leader. It shows how particular social and political-economic backgrounds shaped certain
features of his character, and how those features influenced his political decisions later on.
Mikhail Gorbachev, the first and the last President of the USSR, is a perfect example of a
leader who acted in a new unique historical situation without much of theoretical guidance from the
past. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union started to shift from socialism towards a new political
regime. The Soviet economy transitioned from a planned centralized order towards a free market
based on competitive trade. No politician at that time had to deal with such turmoil before. The
future of the country was very uncertain. According to the conclusions by Fred Greenstein, Emeritus
Professor of Politics (Princeton University), Gorbachev’s role in domestic and world affairs was
very significant at that time.5
The example of Gorbachev’s personality was chosen also because his role and
achievements are very controversial and debatable for people in different parts of the world. In
Russia and in most of the Former Soviet Union republics, he is still blamed by the population for the
collapse of the USSR and for all the economic misery that followed during the 90s when the country

5

The ideas of Fred Greenstein are discussed further in the Review of the Literature chapter.

was adapting to free market. Thus, being asked in 2004 if Mikhail Gorbachev’s governance was
positive or negative for the Soviet people and the country as whole, 53% responded that it was
“more negative,” 21% said “equally positive and negative,” 15% did not give any clear answer, and
only 11% estimated his role as “more positive.”6 At the same time in the West, Gorbachev is praised
for the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and for the end of the Cold War. As
British political scientist and historian Archie Brown concluded in one of his books, Gorbachev “has
contributed to the end of the conflict between East and West more than anybody else.”7
In order to better understand Gorbachev’s achievements and the role he played, one needs
to realize the context of the political and ideological environment in the USSR. The communist
system created by Lenin, and then further developed by Stalin, has been designed for a sole leader
and party, the Secretary General of the Communist Party. The power of the leader was slightly
limited by the Supreme Council of the USSR (Parliament) but did not really have to face any
ideological opposition within the country. The communist system was closed for outsiders and
thoroughly protected from inside dissidents by means of the secret police and intelligence. Josef
Stalin, being the Secretary General, was the most extreme example of a menacing totalitarian leader
who held practically all the power in his hand. All the intelligence and information went through
him. His successors in the Soviet Union were less extreme but the general tradition of power
monopoly and strict censorship was kept.
Realism-based ideology of the Cold War dominated in the Soviet Union for decades. The
balance of power and the enemy image embodied by the United States justified constant arms race
and heavy economic emphasis on military-industrial complex in the USSR. Competitive zero-sum
game divided the world in two major geopolitical camps. The Soviet Union represented one of the

6

Accessed at http://www.prosv.ru/umk/istoriya/4.html

7

Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, London: Bodley Head, 2009.

two camps constantly increasing its weapon arsenals and preparing for the worst-case scenario.
When Gorbachev came to power, he offered much more liberal vision of international politics,
seeking to transform the image of the USSR into that of a partner in solving all-human problems.8
The ideational change he proposed was revolutionary for both domestic and international societies
and entitled even more serious changes than he originally planned.
Mikhail Gorbachev happened to be the very last successor and the last governor of the
communist system. The future president grew up during the period of Stalin’s governance, having
the years of World War II and then period of starvation in his teenage memory. Gorbachev learned
his first lesson of political dualism in his own family when one of the grandfathers was an active
supporter and a member of the Communist Party, while another was strictly against the
collectivization process9 and Stalinism. Nevertheless, both of the grandfathers suffered severely
during Stalin’s regime after World War II.
The paper examines in more detail how this political dualism, childhood in poverty,
combined with his excellent education in Moscow and a number of other factors, influenced his
thoughts that later gave birth to the ideas that have led to the end of the Cold War and changed the
world of the international politics forever.
The study of political psychology in general and the development of a leader’s personality
is a very pertinent field for understanding contemporary international relations. This paper
demonstrates its significance by analyzing the example of Mikhail Gorbachev and his role in world
politics. The results of this research can be applicable in many aspects of foreign diplomacy.
8

Breslauer, George W., Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002,

9

Collectivization - a policy pursued under Stalin between 1928 and 1940. The goal of this policy was to

p.278.

consolidate individual land and labor into collective farms (kolkhoz, plural: kolkhozy).

Among the sources of the literature there are books and articles about political psychology,
personality in politics, and sociology. The case study uses a number of sources written by prominent
historians about the Cold War. It includes but not limited to a biography and autobiography of
Mikhail Gorbachev, contemporary analyses of the Cold War, Russian and Soviet politics, and
personal diaries of a Gorbachev’s aide. The books by Archie Brown, Robert English, Raymond
Garthoff, Anatoli Chernyaev, and Michael Beschloss were especially helpful in building this thesis.

I. Review of the Literature

Political psychology is a relatively new field of science. Officially it became a separate
field of study from psychology in 1968, when a Political Psychology sub-field was created within
the American Political Science Association. At about the same time, a limited number of American
universities, including Yale, started to offer a course on psychology within the department of
political science. Prior to that, political psychology existed mostly in a form of non-systemized facts
and hypotheses, without any unifying theoretical framework. The tasks it was trying to solve were
sometimes incompatible and many methodological problems remained unresolved.10
Nowadays, political psychology is mainly a synthesis of political science and social
psychology. However, it also employs other methods used by other Western psychological schools.
Thus, it relies on principles of behaviorism, psychoanalysis, cognitive psychology and other
disciplines. 11 12 13
The role of a person in politics is explored in two major aspects within the field of political
psychology. The first aspect examines the personality of formal and informal leaders. Sigmund
Freud was one of the chief architects of these studies when he wrote the first psycho-biographical
portrait of the 28th president of the United States Woodrow Wilson. In this study Freud asserted that

10
11

Shestopal E. B.
Behaviorism – a school of psychology that limits itself on studies of objectively observable and measurable

behavior. The main idea is all learning is determined by our reactions to a certain stimulus.
12

Psychoanalysis - a specific mind investigation method, introduced by Sigmund Freud, and a therapy based

on this investigation. The method relies on the study of the unconscious mind and the “free associations” technique.
13

Cognitive psychology – is the school of psychology that studies cognitive processes such as the ways people

perceive information, remember it, think and learn.

Wilson unconsciously identified himself with Jesus Christ.14 This tradition has been further
developed by many other scientists, not only within a psychoanalytical approach. Their studies
attempt to explore the motivation of political behaviors on a wider scale: decision-making processes,
political reasoning, political charisma and mechanisms of influence towards the large groups of
people.
The second large aspect focuses mainly on the political behavior of an average person, as
part of a large group. Here we have different issues to examine: the level of political activity of an
average person (activity, conformity, or political apathy), the types of political activity (leader as an
executive person), mechanisms of attachment to a political system, types of loyalty and other factors
determining the role of a regular person as a part of political activity. In this paper we focus on the
first aspect and take a closer look at the role of political elites.
According to Fred Greenstein, there are three major ways of conducting personality
research. First, there is a method of single-case studies that implies the qualitative examination of
concrete persons, both famous leaders and/or a simple person. Within this approach political
psychologists created a number of individual psychological portraits, so called “psychobiographies.” The main purpose here is to analyze a person by taking a look at the early social
experiences and background, trying to understand the inner motives of the person’s adult decisions.
Among the most prominent scientists within this approach we can mention Alexander George and
Juliette George who wrote about Woodrow Wilson, Indira Gandhi, Vladimir Lenin, Lev Trotsky, or
Eric Ericson with his analyses of Hitler, Luther and Eleanor Roosevelt. Nowadays, we can find
almost every well-known politician in such a gallery of portraits, including Saddam Hussein, Boris

14

Kane, Joseph Natan. Facts about the Presidents from Washington to Johnson, New York: H.W. Wilson

Company, 1964.

Yeltsin, or Bill Clinton. Case studies generally concentrate more on the life experience of a public
figure rather than political situations as a whole.15
Another way to study personality in politics is the “aggregation” of the facts of personal
biography into the course of political events. As Greenstein says, it is “analyses of the collective
effects of individuals and types on the functioning of political institutions ranging all the way from
informal face-to-face groups through organizations and political patterns at the international level.”16
The main goal here is not to portray a character as such, but to use the personality component as a
tool to explain historical events such as revolutions, wars, and/or to describe a political culture,
behavior in groups or a national character. Such historians and political scientists as J. Cocks, C.
Hughes, B. Brodie, A. Gurevich, and others, made their contributions within this approach.
The third major method is “typological,” or multi-case approach. It is based on building
different kinds of typologies and attempts to classify leaders using various terms. Traditionally, the
basic criteria for the classifications were certain psychological features of the leaders, their styles of
behavior, thinking, decision-making and other. Political actors are given psychological terms “from
mere classification of the members of a population in terms of the categories of a single
psychological variable,… through complex typologies identifying syndromes of interrelated
attributes.”17 Among a number of various classifications by different scientists one can distinguish
the authoritarian-based typology by T. Adorno,18 the dogmatism-based theory by M. Rokeach,19 or
the ideas of David Riesman who offered “traditional-inner-and-other directedness.”20

15

16
17
18

Shestopal E. B.
Greenstein, Fred, Personality and Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987, p. 14
Greenstein F., p. 15
T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian

Personality, New York: Harper, 1950.

H. D. Lasswell and J. D. Barber divided politicians according to the political “roles” they
played. Lasswell offered a division by “agitator-administrator-theorist” principle21, while Barber
proposed his famous “spectator-advertiser-reluctant-lawmaker” classification.
Analyzing the problem of personality factors in politics, Greenstein made several
important conclusions. He noted that the role of a politician becomes especially important when the
person has to act in, firstly, a new unique situation that has never happened before in history;
secondly, in a situation that is too complicated and unclear, and thirdly, in a situation where a leader
has to choose between two or more political forces offering opposite political solutions. According
to Greenstein, the role of a leader in politics grows proportionally (a) to the degree of the social
environment’s receptivity to the leader’s decisions, (b) to the status of a man in a political system
and (c) to the strength of personal Ego of a politician.22

A special sub-discipline of political science that concentrates mainly on biological
components of a person as of factors of political behavior is called Biopolitics. It examines
aggression, violence, altruism, defensive mechanisms, dominance and other patterns of behavior in
the context of politics.23 According to E. B. Shestopal, the spectrum of determinants of successful
political behavior includes and not limited to temperament, gender, age, genetic material, health
condition, and even the type of the body constitution. Such features are not self-sufficient, but,

19
20

Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, New York: Basic Books, 1960.
David Riesman, with Nathan Glazer and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1965.
21

Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

22

Shestopal E. B., p. 57-60.

23

Somit A., Peterson S.A. Biological Correlates of Political Behavior // Political Psychology. Contemporary

Problems and Issues, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986.

combined with personal characteristics and social skills, they appear as important factors of political
activity and career of a politician.24
One of the most important characteristics for a politician who is going to start an election
campaign is his/her age. Younger or even very youthful leaders generally become popular at times
of crises, when society is looking for a long-anticipated change, for radical reforms. People want to
see a political leader who would not be associated with the old ruling class and therefore would be
able to replace former political elites with a new team. As an example, the contrast between aging
and constantly being in need of medical treatment Boris Yeltsin and much younger and healthier
looking Vladimir Putin was one of the key factors of Putin’s success during the presidential
elections in Russia.25 Becoming a President at the age of 48, Putin won over 50% of the electoral
vote in 2000.26 When Barack Obama was running for the presidential office in 2008, being in his
forties, the main words of his campaign were “HOPE” and “CHANGE”. The major competitor,
Senator John McCain, who was twenty five years older, failed to win the race. After eight
consecutive years of Republican Party rule, the society was ready to vote for a person who had less
of international, political and life experience but for the one who was more energetic and willing for
a change.
On the other hand, during a period, characterized by stable political development and
economic growth, a country would most likely have an older leader who has been in power long
enough to become old. In tradition-oriented political cultures venerable age is usually a symbol of
wisdom and valuable life experience. As the examples, professor E. B. Shestopal refers to Iranian
religious leader ayatollah Khomeini, aged Chinese leaders Mao Zedong, Dan Xiaoping, or North

24

Shestopal E. B., p. 45-51.

25

Ibid.

26

Accessed at: http://www.bfm.ru/yellowpages/celebrities/Putin_Vladimir_Vladimirovich/

Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, and others.27Age is a purely biological characteristic. It influences
ability to memorize and adopt new information, flexibility towards new stereotypes and habits, thus
affecting a person psychologically. But it becomes more valuable politically if we take into
consideration such circumstances as current political and economic situation in the country,
prevailing traditions and needs of the society.28
Gender is also an important biological factor in political career. While women have
traditionally been playing significant roles in politics, those roles have been mostly unofficial,
“behind the scenes.” They often act as unofficial advisors and personal assistants to their spouses.
On the level of state leaders, marital status and the image of the first lady play important
role in a leader’s reputation and political career. As an example of such influence we can mention
Nikolas Sarcozy who kept his unsuccessful marriage until he got elected as the President of France
and then got remarried less than a year after the elections. Many French voters found his choice of
the non-French singer and former model Carla Bruni inappropriate and distasteful. Sarcozy’s
divorce and quick second marriage drew tremendous attention to the President’s private life thus
distracting people from actual political situation of that time.
As TIME magazine pointed out, the image of Michelle Obama and her activities
periodically help to distract attention from criticism on her husband. “The Administration muddles
along; the President’s popularity dips and dives – Mrs. Obama just puts her best outfit forward.”29
Mikhail Gorbachev was criticized for not making any decision without consulting his wife
Raisa, whose image appeared to be very different from what was traditionally expected from Soviet
Union leaders’ spouses. Raisa Gorbacheva’s style and personality along with her advanced

27

Shestopal E. B.
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Ibid.
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Kate Betts, “Style Meets Substance,” in TIME, Vol. 177, No. 6, p. 48.

education contributed towards the growth of her husband’s popularity in the West but it was not
appreciated the same way within the Soviet Union.
All the above examples show the importance of women’s role in politics when they act as a
part of their husbands’ political image. But there is a very limited number of women who actually
managed to become high-level politicians themselves. Gender disproportion causes massive feminist
movements who complain about discrimination and inequality in politics.
A woman who wishes to pursue political career generally has to posses typically male
traits of character. Thus, British Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher demonstrated severity,
abruptness, and inability to compromise. Those qualities helped her to get and stay on her position.
She was described as a person with “male character and manners of a street vendor.”30 Similar traits
were demonstrated by many other female politicians including Yulia Timoshenko, former primeminister, the Orange Revolution activist and now prominent opposition leader in Ukraine.
Temperament and other genetically determined characteristics shape political behavior
both on personal and mass levels. Politicians in Southern countries and regions are generally more
spirited and vigorous comparing to their colleges from the North. More energetic public speeches
and actions allow politicians to ignite a crowd emotionally and stay memorable for the electorate. It
is still remembered how Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev was banging his shoe on a table
during an United Nations session in order to get the attention of the audience to his words.31
Physical condition and appearance of a politician create the basic perception of him/her by
mass public. External part of a person is compared to an image of an ideal politician that is fixed in
mass minds. According to E. B. Shestopal, in most cultures massive glasses, flabby body or highheel shoes (for a man) can potentially destroy politician’s career despite his/her obvious public

30

Shestopal E. B., ch. 10.2

31

Ibid.

achievements. As the exceptions, the author mentions F. D. Roosevelt, who managed to successfully
rule the country being wheelchair-bound, and J. F. Kennedy who had to constantly wear a girdle due
to his backbone problems. Despite their physical disabilities, both Presidents went down in history
as far-sighted, determined patriots. But for the most part, physical disability or poor health appears a
serious obstacle on the path of political career.

II. Case Study

The second chapter examines in detail Mikhail Gorbachev as a political leader and a
decision-maker. By analyzing his biography, starting from his childhood, I will show how the key
traits of Gorbachev’s personality have developed and how significant his role was for the peaceful
solution of the Cold War and the future of international affairs.

EARLY YEARS
Mikhail Gorbachev was born on March 2nd, 1931, in the small southern village of
Privol’noye, Stavropol region, Russia. His ancestors were Cossacks who were pushed out of
Ukraine and the river Don area in search of virgin soil. They settled in the southernmost territory of
Stavropol, known as the Northern Caucasus.
Mikhail was born in a family of hard-working Russian and Ukrainian migrants. His beliefs
centered on the experiences he learned from the two different political temperaments of his
grandfathers.
His maternal grandfather, Panteley Gopkalo, was an active member of the Communist party
and a collectivization32 participant. Being the leader of a kolkhoz, or a local collective farm, he was
the most important person in the village.
In contrast, his paternal grandfather, Andrei Gorbachev was a staunch opponent of
collectivization and Stalin’s ideology. Andrei refused to share his harvest, even with his son Sergey
since Sergey became a collective farmer. In his memoir, Mikhail described an episode during World
War II, when the German Nazis occupied his village and were going to annihilate all the communist

32

Collectivization - a policy pursued under Stalin between 1928 and 1940. The goal of this policy was to

consolidate individual land and labor into collective farms (kolkhoz, plural: kolkhozy)

families. Instead of hiding the grain, Andrew hid the twelve-year-old Mikhail on his farm. However,
despite their very different political views, both grandfathers suffered from Stalin’s repression
during the 1930s. Panteley Gopkalo was charged as “an active member of provocative organization”
and escaped execution by a miracle, spending some time in prison. For having hidden forty pounds
of grain for his family, Andrei Gorbachev, was arrested and deported to Siberia for a few years.
Despite the fact that repression affected both families of Gorbachev’s parents, neither grandfather
blamed Stalin for it. They considered zealous local executives responsible for their troubles. Later,
Mikhail Gorbachev would say: “Stalinism demoralized not only hangmen but their victims as well.
Betrayal became a very popular illness of the society.”33
Mikhail Gorbachev’s first lessons of political pluralism and tolerance came not only from
his politically polarized grandfathers but also from his family lifestyle. There were Lenin and Stalin
portraits in one corner and Orthodox icons brought by his grandmother from Kiev Monastery in
another corner of their house.
The conflicting roles that his grandfathers played contributed to the division in Gorbachev’s
character that allowed him to rise to the top of the ruling establishment as an active Communist and
then to turn around and un-deliberately destroy the whole system.

World War II, that killed over 27 million Soviets, left a ten-year-old Mikhail with
troublesome memories of starvation and extreme poverty. For almost five months, the Nazis
occupied his village. In recounting his experience, Gorbachev wrote:
We were wartime children who survived. Nothing of the life and deeds
of our generation is understandable unless we take this into consideration.

33

Mikhail Gorbachev, Ponyat perestroiku. Pochemu eto vazhno seychas. Understanding of Perestroika. Why it

is important now, Moscow: Alpina Busines books, 2006, p.56.

Because we shouldered the responsibility for our families’ survival and for our
own subsistence, we little boys became instant grownups. Peace, and with it our
ordinary lives, collapsed before our eyes. 34

The postwar way of life, close to serfdom, combined with his curiosity and unrestrained
energy paved Mikhail’s way for changing his life completely. Young Gorbachev engulfed himself in
the world of studies. All subjects interested him, including math, physics, and literature. In high
school, he joined the theater program, playing many different roles. He enjoyed theatre so much
that he considered acting as a possible future career.
As a leader of komsomol, (or Young Communist League)35 during his school years
Gorbachev was very strict with those who were late or undisciplined, but he also showed respect for
adults and goodwill for classmates.
Right after the War, at the age of fourteen, Mikhail started helping his father with work on
the collective farm. When he was seventeen, Mikhail was awarded the Order of Red Banner of
Labor for his job as a combine operator. This honorable insignia made him special among his
schoolmates and helped him in his future career.
Hard labor in the field strengthened Mikhail’s relationships with his father Sergey. Till the
very end, they were close friends, spending a lot of time together. Mikhail inherited his father’s
chivalrous respect for women and passion for any kind of information. Sergey Gorbachev had only
four years of secondary school education but always enjoyed reading newspapers, watching the
news on TV and then discussing it with his son.
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Relations with his mother, Maria Gorbacheva, were more difficult. She was a very strong
and outspoken woman in contrast to her intelligent and mild-mannered husband. In one of his
interviews, Gorbachev, talking about his “constant hesitations” during decision-making process,
mentioned that his “mother has never had any doubts. She never went to any kind of school and
everything has always been clear to her.”36 Maria Gorbacheva was very conservative and refused to
change her way of life and habits under any circumstances. She never wanted to leave her village in
the Stavropol region even though her son became Secretary General. Only in 1992, after Gorbachev
resigned, was she convinced and finally agreed to leave the village where she had spent all her life
and move to Moscow.
The image of a strong woman around Gorbachev explains why he conceded so much power
to his wife, Raisa. He regarded her as an instructor at times and saw her as a full partner, referring to
his wife as “my General.”37
Maria Gorbacheva was partly of Ukrainian descent. Her Russian speech was constantly
mixed with Ukrainian words. This cultural dualism made Gorbachev feel very close to the Ukrainian
people. Later, in December 1991, he would mention his Ukrainian roots in an interview for
Ukrainian television, desperately trying to keep Ukraine within a new fledging union that was
designed to replace the USSR.38
In 1950, when Mikhail was nineteen, he asked his father’s permission to apply to a
university. His dad was very brief and said, “If you’re enrolled, we will help you as much as we can.
Otherwise you can always come back and continue working together in the farm.” The will to get
out of peasant life and his endless thirst for knowledge were so strong that Mikhail applied to five
schools at the same time, including engineering, diplomacy, and finally the law department of
36
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Moscow State University (MSU), one of the most prestigious and highly competitive programs in
the country. In high school Gorbachev received a silver medal, a special award given to excellent
students after the whole period of studying. The medal and the Order of Red banner of Labor given
to him earlier contributed to the fact that he was admitted by MSU without any exams. Hedrick
Smith, a famous American journalist who had been working in Moscow for long time and wrote a
book about Gorbachev, said that for a guy from a small southern village to get admitted by the
famous Moscow university is like an African American kid from Louisiana to become a Harvard
student.39
In September 1950, after traveling more than 1,500 kilometers (about 930 miles) by train,
Mikhail arrived in Moscow. A completely new period of his personal development was about to
begin.

STUDENT YEARS AND MARRIAGE
Talking about his origins in his memoirs, Gorbachev says: “In order to make the reforms
you have to live the life I’ve lived and see the things I’ve seen. To be from the family that went
through the drama of collectivization and repressions of 1937. To graduate from Moscow University
is one of the most important things in this to-do list.”40
Studying in Moscow significantly affected Gorbachev’s intellectual and social
development. The law program in MSU was very hard and intense. Some of the professors had been
working there since before the Revolution. In addition to Marx-Lenin theories, Gorbachev studied
Roman law, political science, oratory, and the constitutions of great bourgeois states, such as the
United States. This intellectual atmosphere contributed to Mikhail’s political pluralism and tolerance
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of non-Communist ideologies. Many years later, Gorbachev would be criticized for his sympathy for
the Western way of life. He would be blamed by the Soviet people for “giving up” to American
culture and would be informally named Michael Gorby, in an Americanized manner.41
The future president lived in a dormitory where, due to global poverty, there were fifteen to
twenty people per room. As one of his former roommates recalls, there were constant discussions
about philosophy, political ideologies, Lenin, Stalin, and other leaders, in the room. Some of those
men were arrested and sent to exile later for not being careful enough in their jokes and thoughts
about Stalin.
Gorbachev in his memoirs says that education transformed his passion and curiosity into a
stable interest in philosophy, politics and theories. Being from a small village, he had trouble at first
adapting to the big city. Gorbachev overcame some lack of knowledge by his purposefulness and
persistence. Having an amazing thirst for studies, he spent most of the time in a library reading
books. Such qualities were not rare for students of that time. After the war, many young people
considered education the only way to succeed in life, and Gorbachev was one of them.
The individual traits of everybody in the dormitory were especially visible due to the severe
economic conditions of students at that time. Young men were sharing food and gifts from home
with each other. It was not abnormal to borrow a warm coat from a friend. A “student’s wardrobe
never was personal, we all were sharing with each other,” recalls Gorbachev about his student life.42
During his university years, Mikhail was known as a friendly and open person. His former
classmates point out his spontaneous democratism, provincial openness, and leadership qualities. He
was elected as a komsorg, komsomol leader, and then, in 1952, a Communist Party member.
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High level education gave him certain advantages in the future, but on the other hand, he
had to learn how to deal with his less educated colleagues. Most Soviet leaders, who worked during
the Brezhnev era, had received a very poor education from provincial technical institutes or obtained
it through external study only. None of Gorbachev’s Politburo peers had spent a full five years
studying in a major Russian university.43

In 1953, Mikhail Gorbachev married Raisa Titarenko, a girl from a small city of Rubtsovsk
in the Altai region of Siberia. She was the eldest of three children of a Ukrainian-born railway
engineer. Raisa’s family also suffered greatly during the repression of the 1930s. Her mother’s
family was categorized as “rich peasants,” and their house and land were confiscated. Raisa’s
grandfather was accused of “Trotskyism” and “disappeared without trace.”44 For a long time the
family thought he died in a labor camp, and only in 1993 were Raisa and Mikhail Gorbachev able to
find out that Raisa’s grandfather was actually executed for the fact that he used to own private land.
Raisa Gorbacheva’s grandmother “died of grief and hunger as the wife of an enemy of the people,”
and her four children “were left to the mercy of fate.”45 Since the family was very poor, Raisa could
not always afford even warm clothes and shoes while living in Moscow. She looked very modest,
and, as her husband certifies, did not start to use lipstick until after she turned thirty.
Mikhail and Raisa had a lot in common. Both spouses were half-Russian and halfUkrainian. Both had come to Moscow from poor, diligent families, and considered studies as a
logical continuation of their hard-working way of life. Both were provincial and foreign to the big
city. Raisa spent all her early years in the Ural Mountains region and came to Moscow to study
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philosophy at MSU. They shared the same common habits and interests. For example, both loved
evening walks, and it became their sacramental ritual for many years.
Despite all those similarities, Raisa was much stronger, much more organized, and a more
pedantic person than her husband. All the books in their home library were placed in alphabetical
order. She could leave a theater in the middle of a show and go home if she had to finish reading a
book or to prepare for an upcoming exam. When Mikhail got promoted and the couple started going
abroad, Raisa was preparing for their first trips as for an exam – reading historical literature, visiting
museums and taking notes there. When the couple came back to Moscow in 1978, after twenty three
years spent in Stavropol, Raisa organized for her and her husband a more thorough exploration of
the capital. Every Sunday they visited historical places in chronological order starting from the
earliest.
Raisa’s high-level discipline and extreme orderliness crystallized during the years of
studies in Moscow and then as a teacher in Stavropol. Those qualities were her means to compensate
for the lack of knowledge and “universal culture” that she did not receive from her family and that
made her feel inferior in Moscow.
However, Raisa Gorbacheva created a furor in the international political arena when she
appeared in the mass media as an elegant, independent, and up-to-date first lady, which was not
expected from the Soviet Union at that time. Despite spending twenty-three years in provincial
Stavropol, Raisa followed all the current political and fashion trends. She also became her husband’s
personal image-maker, though the word “image” was not known to Soviet people at that time. Raisa
played the role of his unofficial political advisor, being his so-called “personal minister of
international affairs.” During the years of political transition in the Soviet Union, as Gorbachev later
recognized, the Secretary General, accompanied by his “educated, energetic wife” was a “second

revolution.”46	
   It indicated both close personal ties between the spouses at one hand, and “a strong
Westernizing element in Gorbachev’s political style” on the other hand. According to the Western
standards, contrary to the Soviet ones, it was absolutely normal for a political leader to be
accompanied by his/her spouse in public.47
Gorbachev was broadly criticized for his inability to make political decisions without
conferring with his wife first. Once being asked during an interview what kinds of issues of public
life he discussed with his wife, Gorbachev replied, “We discuss everything.” When a journalist
inquired if the discussions include Soviet affairs at the highest level as well, Gorbachev said: “I
think I answered your question in toto. We discuss everything.” This last part of the interview was
not broadcasted in the Soviet mass media, but was translated by the Moscow World Service in
English.48
Everyday walks together became their unbreakable family tradition. Partially, it was caused
by the fact that outdoors they could discuss all the political issues and be sure nobody else was
eavesdropping. As Anatoly Lukyanov, who was working closely with Gorbachev during his time as
the Secretary General, recalls that Mikhail, if reminded by the end of the day about the need for an
urgent decision, would often say “Let me call you later.” As Lukyanov assumes, it meant the issue
was going to be discussed in the “family politburo” with Raisa during their walking. And closer to
midnight, Gorbachev would always call him back with the decision.49
According to Alexander and Juliette George’s theory, the roles of a strong principled
mother and tractable intelligent father in his family contributed to the fact that Gorbachev felt quite
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comfortable with the super-organized and active Raisa, jokingly referring to her as the “secretary
general in their family.”50

Like millions of Soviet people, Gorbachev and his wife felt devastated after Stalin’s death
in 1953 and asked themselves, what will happen to us? Though both of Mikhail’s grandfathers
suffered under Stalin’s regime, and Raisa’s grandpa was executed in Siberia during the ‘30s, none of
them found Stalin guilty for these actions. People of the Soviet Union used to deeply believe in
Stalinism and cherished the idea of building a new society. Even though many personally knew
someone who was innocent but was persecuted by the Stalin regime, people still were deeply
convinced that “Stalin did not know about it.”51 As some of Gorbachev’s former classmates certify,
Mikhail never was a big fan of Stalin’s personality, but never showed any signs of criticism or
disagreement. His anti-Stalinism and intolerance of the political environment showed up much later
while working in Stavropol after graduation.
Since education in the Soviet Union was totally sponsored by the government, recent
graduates were unable to freely choose their place of work right after the completion of their studies.
Most of the students after graduation were distributed to various locations and positions based on
their major, GPA, state needs, and other factors. There was an option to continue studies in graduate
school, but Mikhail, as a native farmer, was offered to study peasant law instead of law and political
science, which he desired. Gorbachev, a non-compromiser, refused to sacrifice his major and
professional interests for a life in Moscow. And even though Raisa was offered the chance to stay in
graduate school, they decided to move to provincial Stavropol, the capital of the region where he
was from.
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EARLY CAREER AS A YOUNG POLITICIAN
Stavropol in the 1950s was “more than provincial,” as Raisa characterized it later.52 The
whole city did not even have a reliable water supply. There was one major street and almost no
public or personal transportation. People commuted mostly on foot. After five years in Moscow,
Stavropol seemed too undeveloped for the young couple.
A few unsuccessful attempts to get employed as a lawyer made Mikhail go to the local
office of the komsomol. Because of Mikhail’s impressive qualifications and merits he was
immediately hired there. It was a position where energy, responsibility, and communicative skills
were much more important than his special knowledge.
Mikhail’s abilities made him distinct among local komsomol workers and brought him to
the attention of the local leadership. Gorbachev’s career developed dramatically. In March 1961, at
the age of thirty, he was already elected as the first secretary of the komsomol in the Stavropol
region and was given his first separate apartment instead of a room in a dormitory.
Meanwhile, Raisa was not so successful during their first four years in Stavropol. Having
graduated with distinction from MSU, she was considered overqualified for regular positions in the
province. In 1957, she gave birth to their only daughter, Irina, finished her Master’s degree, and then
became a lecturer in a local university. Raisa’s example inspired Mikhail to continue his education
and write a Master’s thesis as well. Gorbachev passed the initial exams but never accomplished his
scientific dreams. His political career went on, and in 1969, his former chiefs, who had moved to
Moscow by that time, decided to promote the young promising secretary. In April 1970, Gorbachev
visited the Moscow office of the Secretary General, having no idea he was going to run it in fifteen
years. The same year, at the age of thirty nine, he was appointed First Party Secretary of the
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Stavropol Kraikom, regional Committee. This distinction made him one of the youngest provincial
party chiefs in the nation. The Stavropol region was considered one of the most economically
important in the country, and its territory was as large as Belgium, Switzerland, and Cyprus
combined. In this position, he helped reorganize the collective farms, improve workers' living
conditions, expand the size of their private plots, and give them a greater voice in planning.
He soon became a member of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1971. Three
years later, in 1974, he was made a Representative to the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union and
Chairman of the Standing Commission on Youth Affairs. Mikhail was subsequently appointed to the
Central Committee's Secretariat for Agriculture in 1978, replacing his main supporter and political
protector Fyodor Kulakov, after Kulakov died of a heart attack.
While being a high-ranked person in the Stavropol region, Gorbachev saw how primitive
the living conditions of simple hard-working people in small towns were. The fifteen year period
when Gorbachev’s political career in Stavropol developed successfully, was very important in the
context of the Soviet politics. Nikita Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the Twentieth Party Congress
in early 1956 dethroned Stalin’s image that had been cultivated for decades in the Soviet Union. The
speech was not published for the Soviet people, but quickly leaked to the Western press. Facts
disclosed by Nikita Khrushchev had a profound effect on Gorbachev’s party members then. In one
of his later interviews, in 1993, Mikhail said:
The document containing Khrushchev’s denunciations circulated briefly
within the party, and then it was withdrawn. But I managed to get my hands on it.
I was shocked, bewildered and lost. It wasn’t an analysis, just facts, deadly facts.
Many of us simply could not believe that such things could be true. For me it was

easier. My family had itself been one of the victims of the repression of the
1930s.53

Khrushchev’s speech definitely brought some “rebel thoughts” to the educated youth of
that time, including Gorbachev, but remained unacceptable for the majority of aged Party members.
Nobody acted on it back in 1956. It became well-known for the Soviet society much later, when
Gorbachev himself became the Secretary General.

Being the most important person in the Stavropol region, Gorbachev denied many benefits
given him due to his position. Even though he had a personal service car, he always walked to his
office. People used this habit in order to approach him right on the street and ask him for something
in person. His daughter Irina attended regular school instead of the only special English school for
VIPs. The question whether the service car and a personal driver should be used for her was not
even opened for discussion – the idea itself was considered inappropriate. His biographers describe
Mikhail’s desire for a normal life is as an attempt to keep family traditions and not to forget where
he came from.54
The first ideas for his future perestroika, policy of economic and political reformation of
the country, Gorbachev had heard from docent Fyodor Sadykov, who attempted to present his
prescriptions for renovation of the system in 1968, soon after the Czechoslovakia’s attempt for
political liberalization.55 As Gorbachev recalls in his memoirs, political elites, including himself,
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tore down all Sadykov’s ideas, but later on Mikhail felt bad about this situation, recognizing that the
docent was right. All these “bad feelings” combined with childhood memories of collectivization,
repression of his family, and extreme poverty multiplied by his university knowledge of political
science became a springboard for changes in his internal ideology.

International delegations and his first trips abroad provided him with elementary lessons in
political pluralism and a better vision of what was going on in other countries. While on a delegation
trip to Prague in 1969, he realized that the events of the Prague Spring were misinterpreted by the
Soviet media. Moreover, Gorbachev later described that trip as a “painful” experience admitting that
“They [Soviet media] doled us with very little information of what was going on.”56 He realized that
the people of Czechoslovakia were more than unhappy because of the Soviet intervention in their
domestic affairs. And Gorbachev as a member of the delegation experienced all the resentment and
discomfort while being there.57
In 1957 Mikhail organized the participation of an Italian delegation for one of the youth
festivals in Moscow. The Italians’ vision of time, protocol, and discipline appeared to be very
different from what punctual and responsible Gorbachev was used to.
Trips abroad, especially to the West, were not allowed to regular, non-privileged, Soviet
Union citizens. Gorbachev and his wife were lucky enough to be granted the permission to go
abroad not only as part of a political delegation, but also privately. His first trips to the Western
block countries (France, Italy, Belgium, FRG) were surprisingly different from the social block
countries such as Bulgaria or GDR. The future Secretary General made at least two very important
economy. The Soviets, after failed negotiations, sent troops to occupy the country. While there was no military
resistance Czechoslovakia remained occupied till 1990.
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conclusions for himself after visiting Westernized countries. First of all, he realized that Soviet
people were not living in the best of worlds, as the Party had been convincing them. Not only the
Western leadership class, but also simple people lived and worked in conditions that even USSR
hegemons had never even seen. Second of all, Gorbachev and his wife were amazed by the relaxed
atmosphere of the imperialistic environment. The Soviets were investing most of the budget in the
military block to protect themselves from the capitalist threat, but the people representing this threat
were surprisingly friendly and benevolent with them. The Soviet propaganda regarding capitalist
countries and the reality of the Western world appeared to be very different. After one of those trips,
Raisa, who was also impressed by the beauty and culture of Western Europe, asked her husband an
anti-Soviet question: “Why do we live worse, Mikhail?”58 While residing in Stavropol, Gorbachev
could not find an answer to this question. Things started to change when the family moved back to
Moscow in December 1978.

BACK TO MOSCOW
From the moment Gorbachev’s family was transferred back to Moscow in 1978, Mikhail
already had made a successful Komsomol-Party career. He became the first secretary of one of the
most important regional committee. He already felt comfortable entering offices of high-ranking
leaders, though in his 40s he was the youngest secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
USSR Party at that time. His wife Raisa was ambitiously thinking about a scientific career in a
university, but had to recognize that as her husband’s personal advisor and consultant, she had much
more opportunity to realize her strengths.
The USSR during the ‘70s was experiencing the period of so-called “Brezhnev stagnation,”
the time of socio-economic slowdown under Leonid Brezhnev that started in the 1970s and
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continued during the short administrations of his successors Yuri Andropov and Konstantin
Chernenko.
As Archie Brown noted in one of his books, Brezhnev was building his leadership style as
differently as possible from Khrushchev’s. If Khrushchev was more impulsive and decisive,
Brezhnev was then a very circumspect and consensus-seeking leader. If Khrushchev was able to
criticize Stalin and demote party officials, Brezhnev was famous for his “stability of cadres” policy.
The party apparatus was very stable, people did not have to worry much about losing their jobs
within the party. By bringing and keeping in power people who were personally indebted to him,
Brezhnev gained even more political power by the end of his life, despite very poor health and
mental problems. He cherished the basic norms of the Soviet system and was very careful about
protecting it from undesirable political thinking.59
Anatoly Chernyaev, Gorbachev’s former close aide, described the following story. Leonid
Brezhnev loved to watch a very popular movie series “Seventeen Moments of Spring” about a
Russian intelligence agent in Germany. He saw it about twenty times. Once, at the end of the film
when the main character was told that he has been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union,
Brezhnev asked his advisors: “Has he received it yet? I’d like to hand it to him myself.” Everybody
praised Vyacheslav Tikhonov, the actor who played the main role, and Brezhnev demanded to bring
him to the Kremlin. A few days later the Secretary General personally awarded Tikhonov the Hero
Star and the Order of Lenin, under the full impression that he was in fact the main character, the
agent. Another aide who attended the ceremony noted, “Everything that Leonid Ilyich [Brezhnev]
said indicated that he was absolutely convinced that Tikhonov had actually performed all of
Shtirlitz’s [main character] deeds.”60
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This example indicates the declining state of the country and its leadership.
Brezhnev passed away in November 1982. After five days of national mourning, he was
buried in the Kremlin Wall together with all his medals.61 Yuri Andropov, long-time KGB62 chief,
succeeded Brezhnev. Andropov began some modest reforms and gave hopes for the forthcoming
end of the “stagnation era.”
Andropov died in February 1984 of kidney failure after less than two years in power. He
was succeeded by seventy-two-year-old Chernenko who lasted for thirteen months. Finnish
intelligence predicted from the beginning that this new Secretary General will be only a “transitional
figure” for the Soviet Union. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) characterized Chernenko as the
man who had lighted Brezhnev’s cigarettes for him when Brezhnev was trying to quit smoking.63
According to Anatoli Chernyaev’s book-diary, physically declining Chernenko was shown on TV
only twice. The first time, supposedly voting at a polling station, and then again at the Supreme
Soviet of the Russian Republic. The second time he even tried to pronounce something. “It was a
humiliating, mortifying sight.”64 When Chernenko passed away in March 1985, “the eulogies about
the general secretary’s outstanding accomplishments, contributions, and virtues were forgotten faster
than the candles by his coffin burnt out.”65
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Political leaders from other countries who regularly gathered in Moscow for funeral
ceremonies were joking among themselves: “See you again, same time, next year!”66 Members of
George H. W. Bush’s party (who was Reagan’s vice-president back then) knew the routine very well
by 1985: “the viewing of the corps, the military parade on the Red Square, the reception in St.
George’s Hall, the spaghetti dinner prepared by the excellent Italian chef at Spaso House.”67
According to Michael Beschloss, while attending Chernenko’s funeral, Vice-President
George H.W. Bush and the CIA Soviet analyst Robert Blackwell were shocked by how excited
people seemed to be about getting rid of their “doddering old men.” “Not more than thirty minutes
after the funeral procession, they saw workmen tearing down Chernenko posters and throwing them
into the trash.”68
Due to a lucky consequence of conditions, such as the decades that the country spent under
over-aged leadership, with three Secretary Generals in less than 3 years, Andropov’s protection of
Gorbachev, and the following favor of other authoritative people, Mikhail’s career rose
dramatically. After many years living like in “a nursing home,” Soviet people were pleasantly
surprised to see a young, educated, and lively leader on the political stage. In March 1985, the next
day after Chernenko’s death, Gorbachev was elected the Secretary General of the USSR.

DOMESTIC REFORMS. CHERNOBYL DISASTER
The year 1985 became the year of big changes in the Soviet Union. The Brezhnev epoch of
stagnation was over, and energetic Gorbachev started his famous innovative project of perestroika.
The word literally means “reconstruction” or “rebuilding” and meant the improvement of socialism
and the economic system that was on the brink of bankruptcy. As soon as he became the Secretary
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General, Gorbachev realized the urgent need for political and economic change. It was planned to be
a reform within the system by means of democratization. The idea of perestroika was complex and
included many politically and economically crucial decisions for which Gorbachev is still mostly
blamed within the former USSR and praised in many foreign countries.
Gorbachev began with the famously unsuccessful large-scale anti-alcohol campaign. It
included attempts to educate the population against alcohol abuse typical for the Soviet people. The
campaign also contained complex measures to limit the production, distribution, sales and
consumption of liquor. Many famous vineyards were cut down, significant number of shops were
not allowed to sell alcohol anymore, and a majority of vodka distilleries were shut down. Liquor
drinks were not allowed to be served in restaurants before 2 p.m. Even high-level Soviet receptions
became alcohol-free, unthinkable for many hosts and guests.69 The alcohol ban brought a slew of
problems. The price of liquor increased, and retail sales were very limited. The consumption of
home-made low-quality vodka increased dramatically, and so did cases of alcohol-poisoning. The
state budget incurred losses from liquor industry revenues, and people were forced to stay in long
lines outdoors for licensed alcohol, criticizing the government for the inconvenience.
The fight against alcohol was happening in a country still shocked by the disaster at the
nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine. In April 1986, one of its nuclear reactors exploded in the
middle of the night, causing an expulsion of highly radioactive fallout into the atmosphere, killing
and mutilating thousands of people. The Chernobyl accident became the worst nuclear disaster in
world history and indicated the need for glasnost, Gorbachev’s policy of openness and
democratization of all the sides of social life. The word glasnost is derived from Russian golos,
voice, and can be translated as policy of openness. The idea of glasnost originally was perceived by
Communists as freedom of constructive criticism or self-criticism but not the absence of censorship
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in mass media. However, during perestroika years, due to efforts of progressive journalists and
activists, glasnost was realized mostly as freedom of speech. The press law, passed in March 1990,
allowed the Soviet mass media to reach some certain level of independence from the Party’s control.
Most likely, Gorbachev could not imagine back then that the unleashed glasnost would bring
unpredictable changes to the country. New political forces that appeared as the result of
democratization, took perestroika far beyond its original purpose of perfecting socialism.70
The Chernobyl disaster highlighted all the ugliness and ineffectiveness of the Soviet
system. The real scale of the tragedy was realized by the leaders only a few days after the explosion.
During those days, local Ukrainian leaders were understating the real number of victims in order
“not to distress Moscow,” and the central government was not sharing any clear information about
the case with its citizens and the world press. Gorbachev kept silent for fourteen days. It took him a
while to overcome the psychological barrier developed by the Communist system and honestly tell
the country the truth, exposing the internal reasons for the disaster. “It’s all because most of our
‘closed’ ministries and scientific centers stayed out of control. That’s where monopoly in politics,
science, and industry led us. Closeness entails the spirit of servility, fawning and corruption.”
Gorbachev’s words said after the tragedy indicated both his attitude toward the Communist system
as a whole and his romantic faith in openness and glasnost as a means of real socialism.71
The Chernobyl tragedy had a colossal effect on both domestic and foreign policy. Not only
did it cost the country thousands of lives and billions of rubles, it also exposed all the ugliness and
corruption of the Stalinist system. The disaster uncovered the flaws of central planning with its
haste, sloppiness, and disregard of “the human element.”72 Gorbachev later said that “Chernobyl
‘mercilessly reminded us’ of what nuclear war would really mean, although in fact there was
70
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nothing like it in Soviet memory.”73 In terms of foreign politics, the disaster explicitly showed that
the iron curtain would not offer protection from a radioactive cloud. If anything similar would ever
happen in Europe full of chemical plants, the outcome would affect everybody and would be close
to nuclear war. As Gorbachev put it, “even a limited conflict would mean so many Chernobyls that
you can’t even imagine.”74 The disaster pushed Gorbachev toward “a great, instinctive leap to break
the old cycle of secrecy, stubbornness, and deadlocked negotiations.”75
Half a year later, during the famous Reykjavik summit in October 1986, Gorbachev
shocked Reagan and the American delegation by the proposal of total nuclear disarmament. Even
more shocking was the fact that Ronald Reagan agreed to do so within a ten year period.76 The
American president also shared Gorbachev’s attitude towards destructive weapons and was ready to
consider eliminating all nuclear weapons from military arsenals.77 Nevertheless, the summit in
Reykjavik was considered mostly a failure due to disagreements on the ABM Treaty.78 Reagan and
Gorbachev failed to reach a final solution regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and no
treaty was signed back in 1986. Despite this, the summit still can be considered as a great step
forward. It was the second meeting for Reagan and Gorbachev after the Geneva summit in 1985.
Not much had been achieved in Geneva except the first personal contact between the two leaders in
over six years. Two days after the meeting in Iceland, Reagan explained, “Believe me, the
significance of that meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn’t sign agreements in the end; the
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significance is that we got as close as we did. The progress that we made would’ve been
inconceivable just a few months ago.”79
After the disagreements in Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev’s relationship became
surprisingly warmer. Both leaders trusted each other more than before and spoke more respectfully
in private of each other after the summit. A few years later, when his presidency was over, Reagan
said:
Looking back now, it’s clear that there was chemistry between
Gorbachev and me that produced something very close to a friendship. He was a
tough, hard bargainer. He was Russian patriot who loved his country. We could –
and did – debate from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. But there was a
chemistry that kept our conversations on a man-to-man basis, without hate or
hostility. I liked Gorbachev even though he was a dedicated Communist and I
was a confirmed capitalist.80

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT
In December 1987, the problems of Reykjavik were corrected during the next meeting in
Washington DC. It was the first US-Soviet summit in the American capital in fourteen years and
only the third ever. The meeting began with Reagan’s proposal to address each other by first names
only. “I’m Ron,” said the older host, “I’m Mikhail,” Gorbachev responded. Since then, it was Ron
and Mikhail.81
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The very important historical outcome of the Washington summit was signing of the INF82
Treaty on December 8. The summary of the 127-pages treaty was the following: “each side would,
during the next three years, destroy all of its intermediate- and shorter-range land-based missiles and
their launchers.”83
The completed treaty made Reagan’s rating higher after the Reykjavik stalemate and also
made him feel better personally. Such success was unthinkable back in 1981. Secretary General
Gorbachev, his new thinking policy combined with the two leaders’ will to negotiate with each other
contributed to the signing of the historic INF Treaty.84
The Washington summit showed that the Soviet Union was serious about arms reduction.
Gorbachev was willing to negotiate with the United States. The new thinking policy in the military
sphere was real. Moreover, the two countries were able to reach an agreement on such important
issue. The Treaty gave hope not only to arms control in the future but also to warm up the
relationships between the two super-powers. Gorbachev expressed his belief to dispel the image of
the Soviet Union as an “enemy” of the United States and to show the Soviet’s real interest for
peace.85
As the result of the Washington summit success, Gorbachev’s popularity in the West grew
rapidly. Actually, the first signs of “Gorbymania” were apparent back in late 1985, when Gorbachev
came to New York to give his famous speech at the United Nations. As Anatloly Chernyaev, one of
his close advisors recalls in his diary, nobody expected people in New York to be so excited to meet
Gorbachev on the streets. Cynical and always busy New Yorkers would have no time for exalted
82
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guests, even the Pope did not impress them. Those expectations were completely wrong. New York
City streets were filled with thousands of people who were “shouting, waving their hands and
handkerchiefs, throwing hats and caps, holding homemade signs, nearly falling out of windows,”
when Gorbachev’s cortege was passing by.86 After the Washington summit people saw that his UN
speech about the importance of nuclear disarmament and freedom of choice were not only empty
words. Once Gorbachev’s actions resulted in serious successful talks with the United States, the socalled Gorbymania became even more impressive.

While Gorbachev’s star abroad increased dramatically, the pressures and dissatisfaction
within the Soviet Union also rose significantly.
Gorbachev’s domestic innovations became subject to mass criticism. His anti-alcohol
campaign brought about a complex of new socio-economic issues that failed to solve the original
problem of excessive drinking. The Soviet Union was on the edge of a serious political and,
especially, economic crisis. When he started the economic reform, Gorbachev neither had a strong
program for transitioning towards a market economy, nor enough investments to stimulate such a
transition. A significant part of the budget had been spent on an arms race and on the anti-alcohol
campaign. The shortage of day-to-day goods was dangerously increasing.
Some political opponents considered his reforms too slow and inconsequential while others
blamed him for hastiness. All the critics mentioned the contradictions in his actions. For example,
right after the law of cooperation development, which gave birth to the spread of a shadow
economy, an act against “speculation” passed. The act meant additional restrictions on any kind of
private retail business. Following a law supporting democratization in corporate management,
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another law increasing central planning passed. A law reforming the political system and allowing
free elections preceded the law of “consolidating the role of the Party.”87
In order to understand how and why Gorbachev was able to change so much, it is important
to realize how the Soviet political system functioned. I agree with Archie Brown, who argues that
the elements and norms of the Communist system, that Gorbachev was trying to change so
vigorously, were actually working to his advantage until a certain moment. Even though the whole
system of Stalin-Lenin socialism resisted the reformation, its rigidity actually allowed Gorbachev to
stay in power long enough to make the process of reforms irreversible and unstoppable. The
authority of the Secretary General was enormous. The Central Committee’s opinion played a
significant role, but was far less important than the Secretary General’s opinion. Political pluralism
or any sort of open opposition was unknown to the USSR. Even Gorbachev’s predecessors, who
were much older and therefore very limited physically and sometimes mentally, were still treated
with respect. According to the established rules of the political game, members of the political
leadership did not express any doubts and just followed the policies pursued by Gorbachev, even
though the policies were driving them further and further away from the established norms. Even
though the new thinking88 policy assumed some sort of discussion within the top leadership, party
members who wished to disagree with Gorbachev generally did it in a very respectful way, avoiding
any serious clashes.89
Once the reforms went too far and the system started to fall apart, the communication in
Politburo changed dramatically. The rise of separatist movements within the Soviet Union and
Yeltsin’s growing popularity in 1990 and 1991 made it clear that agreeing with Gorbachev on
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everything may be political suicide. At the Politburo meeting on November 16th, 1990, which
dissolved the Presidential Council established by Gorbachev earlier the same year, heavy criticism
of the current situation overflowed. It was the moment when the Secretary General was blamed for
everything.90

REFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Being constrained on domestic affairs, Gorbachev had the most freedom in the international
arena. He created his foreign policy team by promoting Aleksandr Yakovlev, Anatoly Chernyaev,
Yevgeniy Primakov, Eduard Shevarnadze, and others. Most of them kept playing significant roles in
politics after Gorbachev resigned.91 With the help of his team Gorbachev acted vigorously and
fruitfully abroad.
Mikhail had a good relationship with the United Kingdom leadership. Back in 1984, acting
as the second most important person in the USSR, Gorbachev established contact with the UK
Prime-Minister Margaret Thatcher. She played an important role later, persuading Ronald Reagan
that Gorbachev was a different Soviet leader who “was much less constrained, more charming, open
to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes.”92 In one of her interviews in late
1984, Mrs. Thatcher said: “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.”93 This famous
quote meant that Mikhail was opened to political discussion and more flexible than his predecessors.
Starting from 1985, Gorbachev met annually with the United States leadership, which was
a major breakthrough for the both countries’ relations. The Geneva summit, when Gorbachev and
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Reagan met each other, was the first one in over six years. Nobody expected them to meet three
more times and then again in Malta, when George H.W. Bush became the President.
The first two summits (in Geneva and Reykjavik) were not easy for both parties. The third
meeting in Washington DC resulted in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) Treaty, a very
important step towards the end of the Cold War.
Six months after the Washington meeting, it was Gorbachev’s turn to host the next U.S.USSR summit in late May of 1988. The U.S. delegation to Moscow totaled more than 700 people,
which was even more than the Soviet delegation to Washington of 500 people. Gorbachev worked
very hard to provide a high level of hospitality. He even agreed to Reagan’s wish to meet a group of
dissidents and to address the students of Moscow University.94 According to R. L. Garthoff,
Reagan’s personal interest in seeing the Soviet Union and meeting people there was combined with
the purpose of complimenting Gorbachev on his accomplishments in domestic and international
affairs. The American president also urged him to move on, especially in the field of personal
freedoms and human rights. Even though it caused some defensive reaction from Gorbachev and the
Soviet leadership, Reagan considered this goal quite successfully accomplished.95
When Reagan was asked in Moscow if he still considered the USSR the Evil Empire, he
said, “No. I was talking about another time, another era.”96 On his way home, Reagan gave a major
speech in London. It was very different from his challenging speech in Helsinki on his way to the
Soviet Union. In London he was speaking of Gorbachev as “a serious man, seeking serious reform,”
of glasnost and perestroika, of a growing personal friendship with the Soviet leader, and similarities
between Russians and Americans. Reagan also remarked with cautious optimism, that “quite
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possibly, we’re entering a new era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union. We will
have to see.”97

AFGHANISTAN
The year 1989 was very eventful for both the Soviet domestic scene and especially
international politics. By the middle of February 1989, the last Soviet troops were finally withdrawn
from Afghanistan. The process took longer than it was planned. Since 1985, Gorbachev was trying
to persuade the Politburo that the military presence in Afghanistan was a serious mistake. However,
the major breakthrough in this operation was achieved only by Spring of 1988, when two bilateral
agreements called “the Geneva accords” were signed, and the Soviet withdrawal began.

THE BERLIN WALL
Meanwhile, the events in Eastern Europe were rapidly changing. In August 1989, 130 East
Germans were granted political asylum at the Western mission in East Berlin. The next month,
5,500 did the same at the mission in Prague. When Hungary opened its borders, a thousand East
Germans fled into Austria.98
In the first week of October, Gorbachev visited East Berlin to participate in the 40th
anniversary of the Communist regime. By that time, demonstrations spread though the whole
Eastern Germany. During the anniversary ceremonies, Gorbachev encouraged East Germans to
follow the course of Soviet-style perestroika. The East German Communist leader, Erich Honecker,
knew that the Soviet economy was on the brink of collapse, and that the Soviet people were nearly
fighting in stores to get basic goods. He was convinced that least of all Eastern Germans, the

97

Garthoff, p.358.

98

Beschloss, p. 128-135.

wealthiest citizens of the socialist world, would want to follow the Soviet course of reforms.99
Gorbachev, in turn, understood that the regime in Eastern Germany was about to change. He ordered
his General Staff to make sure that the local Soviet troops did not get involved in the coming strife.
Right after the weekend of October 7, Honecker was removed from his office and replaced with
state security chief Egon Krenz. Krenz won the people’s trust by opposing Honecker’s decision to
suppress demonstrations throughout the country.
On October 25, in Helsinki, Gorbachev had publicly declared that the Soviet Union had “no
right, moral or political,” to interfere in the events in Eastern Europe, adding, “We assume others
will not interfere either.”100 Gorbachev clearly denied use of force in order to suppress antiCommunist movements in Germany. Thus, he let people continue destroying the existing socialist
order. It was in direct contradiction to the Brezhnev Doctrine (the claim of 1968, when the USSR
invaded Czechoslovakia) that the Soviet Union had the right to provide “assistance, including
assistance with armed forces,” to any Communist country where “the people’s socialist gains” were
in danger.101 After Gorbachev’s speech in Helsinki it became clear that the Brezhnev Doctrine was
dead.
Meanwhile, the new Eastern German leader Krenz still thought that massive
demonstrations in his country would lead towards “renovation of socialism.” He insisted that the
Berlin Wall was needed to protect the “two political systems” and “two military blocks.” People
were acting more vocally against the division, and Krenz’s conciliatory measures were not helpful.
He fired the entire cabinet and most of his Politburo, but it did not improve the situation. Krenz

99

Beschloss, p. 128-135.

100

Ibid., p.134.

101

Ibid., p.134.

called Gorbachev over the phone seeking advice. Gorbachev suggested Krenz to open the borders in
order to “let off steam” and “avoid an explosion.”102
On November 9th, the Eastern German government officially announced that the citizens
could now freely leave the country. The same day East and West Berliners were climbing over the
Wall and dancing and cheering with champagne and beer. The Berlin Wall was no longer the barrier
separating Eastern and Western Germany.

THE MALTA SUMMIT
Less than a month after the Berlin Wall fell, in December 1989, Gorbachev had his fifth
summit with the United States leader. By that time, Vice-President George H.W. Bush had
succeeded Ronald Reagan and had become the president.
The summit was scheduled near the island of Malta, on warships of the two countries. A
strong sea storm changed the original plans. The Soviets had to move from the original vessel to a
heavier cruise ship anchored at dockside, and the American delegation boarded the Soviet ship
later.103
President Bush was thoroughly prepared for the Malta summit. Considering the rapidly
changing situation in Germany, he was seeking to establish “a better understanding of and rapport
with Gorbachev.”104 In turn, Gorbachev desired to resume the dialogue of arms control, so he could
“gain U.S. support for perestroika by ending discriminatory trade restrictions and facilitating Soviet
integration into the world economic system, and to assure himself and others in the Soviet
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leadership that the United States would not seek to exploit the fast-moving situation in Eastern
Europe to undercut Soviet security interests.”105
Both leaders were satisfied with the results of the meeting. There were no treaties signed or
negotiated during the Malta summit. However, Bush and Gorbachev exchanged their political views
and started the strategic arms reduction talks (START), agreeing to reduce sharply arsenals of
chemical weapons. The meeting also initiated an important agreement on reducing Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE).106
The Malta summit is often referred to as the end of the Cold War. It did not stop the
confrontation itself, but it happened at the time when a number of significant changes just occurred.
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the Brezhnev Doctrine denial, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and
political reforms within the Soviet Union changed the image of the USSR for the rest of the World.
The relations of the two super-powers reached a level when prospects of the future cooperation
became more important and valuable than the constant competition.107
While taping his New Year’s messages to the Soviet people, Gorbachev named 1989 the
year of the ending of the Cold War saying that: “During the Malta meeting, President Bush and I
agreed that it was essential to get away from the Cold War and also to abandon the weapons of the
Cold War, so that the 1990s can open a period of genuine cooperation.” He also expressed hope that
in 1990, Americans would not be distracted by “hesitations, wait-and-see attitudes, doubts, and
suspicions.”108
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Two weeks after the summit, Eduard Shevarnadze visited NATO headquarters in Brussels.
Such a symbolic step seemed unthinkable even at the beginning of 1989. It was obvious that the
Cold War, which had lasted for more than fifty years, was fading fast.109
The West gradually recognized that Gorbachev was serious about reducing the military’s
power. The culmination was achieved on November 21, 1990, when the “Charter of Paris for a New
Europe” and other agreements were signed in France.110

COLLAPSE OF THE USSR
Meanwhile, the situation within the Soviet Union intensified. While he had the best
intentions, Gorbachev destroyed the Communist system and his own career by not realizing that the
ideology of the Cold War was the main support needed for the Party’s domestic policy. With the
image of an “enemy,” the Soviet people were willing to sacrifice their comfort and wealth in order
to support the military complex and the national interests. Nobody asked the Party government to
report the expenses. Realizing that the threat of the war was over, and the potential aggressor was
becoming a partner and a possible friend, people started asking themselves questions that were
uncomfortable for the government.111
By opening the Soviet economy to global competition, Gorbachev made people realize that
their way of life can be compared not only to the Russian or Soviet past but also to the achievements
of advanced capitalist countries.112
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In January of 1990, McDonald’s opened its first restaurant in Moscow after fourteen years
of negotiations with Soviet bureaucrats.113 With a capacity of 900 seats, it was the largest outlet in
Europe back then. However, its popularity among the Soviets challenged the philosophy of
McDonald’s as a fast-food establishment. Hour long lines outside the restaurant became typical in
its early days. People were amazed by the newly introduced Big Macs, Westernized interior, and the
quality of service. The restaurant became a cult place of interest in Moscow for the next few years.
The appearance of McDonald’s in the capital, televised images of Western living standards,
and opened discussions of the progressive economic reforms in China stimulated consumer
appetites. Further cultural Westernization, stimulated by Gorbachev, undercut traditional images of
“capitalist hell” that was helpful for the ruling class to justify the backward socialist system.
Reduced international threats from the West created preconditions for lowering the Soviet defense
budget and questioned the need for the economic domination of the military-industrial complex.
Gorbachev’s reforms and emphasis on the priority of “all-human values” paved the way for arms
control and other forms of political cooperation. It also undermined the rationale for the Communist
Party’s long-lasting monopoly on power.114
Fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic and international politics, initiated by
Gorbachev, were impossible without the destruction of old elements and inevitable social conflicts.
The political system started to fall apart in 1989 when the Soviet Union republics began to
declare their independence. Attempts to prevent the separation using military force led to
counterproductive results and increased the dissident tendencies, especially in the Caucasus and
Baltic republics. By the middle of 1990, almost all the Soviet Union republics declared their
independence. The Russian Republic did so on the June 12, 1990. Overwhelmed with all the
113
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domestic events, Gorbachev sent his deputy instead of himself to receive his Nobel Peace Prize in
1990.
In the summer of 1991, a new Union treaty was ready to be signed to replace the USSR.
But the attempt of a coup against Gorbachev in August of the same year made it clear that the new
Union would never be functioning. As the events were spinning out of Gorbachev’s control, on
December 8th, 1991, the leaders of Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia (represented by Boris Yeltsin)
met in the place called Belovezhskaya Pushcha, Belorussia, and signed the treaty of liquidation of
the USSR and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States instead. After that,
Gorbachev had nothing to do but to announce his resignation on December 25, 1991.

MAIN ACTORS OF THE COLD WAR ENDING
Even though Gorbachev’s contribution towards the peaceful solution of the Cold War is
hard to overestimate, it is also important to evaluate the roles of other politicians and their advisors
who took part in the events. The most important names are George Shultz, Ronald Reagan, George
H. W. Bush, Eduard Shevarnadze. Despite their obvious achievements, it is still doubtful that
without Gorbachev we would have the Cold War ended without massive bloodshed.
As many historians believe, Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz precipitated the
changes in the international climate. A former Stanford professor of economics, Shultz gave
Gorbachev some very important lessons in economics. As early as 1985, Shultz began educating
Gorbachev that a closed society would never become prosperous. “People must be free to express
themselves, move around, emigrate and travel if they want to… Otherwise they can’t take advantage
of the opportunities available. The Soviet economy will have to be radically changed to adapt to the
new era.”115
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Gorbachev joked that Shultz should have taken over the planning office in Moscow. In a
way, it actually happened. Over the next few years, Shultz used his trips to the Soviet Union to
educate Gorbachev and his advisors. Employing charts and diagrams, the Secretary of State tutored
the Soviet leadership about the trends in global economy and development. His main argument was
always the same: as long as the Soviet Union remains a command economy, it would fall further and
further behind the rest of the developed world.116
Gorbachev was a careful listener. He even reflected some of Shultz’s lessons in his book of
1987, Perestroika, “How can the economy advance, if it creates preferential conditions for backward
enterprises and penalizes the foremost ones?”117
Due to his natural thoughtfulness and luck of economic foresight, Gorbachev never leaped
directly towards a market economy. He hoped to improve socialism and “purify” the ideas of the
October revolution by borrowing valuable ideas from capitalism.118 At that time, Gorbachev had
neither knowledge, nor experience in improving socialism by capitalist means. No one in the world
did.
A very short time after, the course of reforms went beyond his control and brought the
country into a chaotic and disorganized market economy. After the Soviet Union collapsed,
Gorbachev recognized his failure, “The Achilles heel of socialism was the inability to link the
socialist goal with the provision of incentives for efficient labor and the encouragement of initiative
on the part of individuals. It became clear in practice that a market provides such incentives best of
all.”119
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As Don Oberdorfer, the Washington Post correspondent, summarized in his book, the
Shultz’s role was of central importance. Given the endless disputes on Soviet policy within the
Reagan administration, the Secretary of State helped the president to implement the unexpectedly
visionary political views. Reagan wanted to have a less dangerous and more businesslike
relationship with the USSR but did not know how to achieve it. Shultz suggested two major
ingredients for a better dialog. Firstly, he argued that a persistent and practical drive forward was
possible through the accomplishment of evident mutual objectives. Among such objectives were:
arms control pacts, the settlement of regional conflicts, and human rights accords. Secondly, Shultz
had enough organizational skills to mobilize some parts of the U.S. leadership to interact with the
Soviet leaders on a regular basis. Regan wished that to happen, and, according to Oberdorfer, Shultz
was the key figure on the American side who made it happen.120
Another remarkable figure by the end of the Cold War was Eduard Shevarnadze,
Gorbachev’s foreign minister. He was an intensely idealistic, outgoing, native Georgian without any
prior experience or commitments in the area of foreign policy.121 Eduard was a total antipode of his
predecessor Andrei Gromyko in terms of political experience, personality and, most importantly,
attitude towards the West. Gorbachev promoted Shevarnadze mostly as his fellow new thinker and a
personal friend. It turned out to be a good choice. Secretary of state Shultz immediately initiated a
personal contact with his Soviet counterpart. Before long, the two had a remarkably open
relationship where position-taking progressively yielded to reciprocal efforts at problem solving.122
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It was Shevarnadze who strongly recommended Gorbachev to abstain from using military
force in East Germany.123 Both of them, accompanied by another aide, Aleksandr Yakovlev,124
chose to shift Soviet policy from competition to cooperation, to rely on cooperative security, and to
end the Cold War. Gorbachev’s new team shared the idealistic idea of moving from a conflict of
adversarial camps towards a single interdependent world. Not only were Gorbachev’s people openminded enough to recognize the need for reforms; they went beyond that and adopted a liberal
foreign policy despite a slow and cautious reaction from the West.125
Shevarnadze and other members of Gorbachev’s team represented a new image of the
Soviet leadership. Very little did they resemble the “medal-bedecked apparatchiks” of the past.
Their appearance in the international arena reduced the tendency of the West to make provocative
statements about the Soviet Union.126
The role of President Reagan in the solution of the Cold War was also of high importance.
Despite opposite political views, Gorbachev and Reagan had some values in common. Reagan not
only shared Mikhail’s horror of nuclear weapons but, like him, considered efforts to eliminate them
entirely from their military arsenals.127 This intersection of interests was crucial for the success of
the Washington summit where the INF Treaty was signed.
A prominent Sovietologist, John Lewis Gaddis, suggests that Reagan was the most
important figure in establishing the dialog with the Soviet Union. The writer recalls the situation
when a demented man, John W. Hinckley, attempted to murder Reagan in order to impress his own
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idol, the actress Jodie Foster. Gaddis believes that if the bullet had killed Ronald Reagan back in
1981, the Cold War would not have ended because “there probably would not have been an
American challenge to the Cold War status quo.” The most probable Reagan successor in case of his
sudden death was George H.W. Bush. According to Gaddis, Bush would not have changed much in
the U.S.-Soviet relationship, since he belonged to the generation of foreign policy experts who
considered the Cold War inevitable and a permanent feature of the international landscape.128
Gaddis goes further and suggests that the “Brezhnev doctrine” had already been dead
before Gorbachev came to power. This assumption derives from the fact that the Soviet leadership
had a strong preference for a domestic Polish crackdown over an invasion by their forces in 1981.
Archie Brown, along with many other writers, strongly contradicts this approach. Firstly, he
argues that the Poles, and not only the Poles, would definitely have tested their options in the early
1980s, had they felt that the “Brezhnev doctrine” had been abandoned. Secondly, Brown finds it too
pessimistic to think that no other American president at that time would have reacted to the changes
in the Soviet leadership as progressively as Reagan did. The reforms in Soviet domestic and foreign
policy made it hard for the American leadership to stay impervious. Brown argues that either George
H. W. Bush or a Democratic alternative would have responded to the new opportunities offered by
Gorbachev in case of Reagan’s assassination. And finally, Brown gives special credit to Gorbachev
and his team for their ability to realize the need for serious changes both domestically and
internationally. “None of the possible alternative leaders of the Soviet Communist Party was
remotely as reform-minded or as open-minded as he [Mikhail Gorbachev] was.”129
If we briefly analyze the leadership of the two super-powers during the 1980s, we will see
that by 1981, the Soviet Union was ruled by old and weak people. Brezhnev was in a very poor
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health, and his successors, Andropov and Chernenko, lasted in office barely more than a year each
before passing away. Those people and their aides were mostly closed-minded, ideologically
ossified bureaucrats.130
In contrast, Ronald Reagan, who took office in January 1981, was vigorous and ideological.
He openly supported hard-line anti-Soviet policy: a massive military build-up; a high-technology
threat by means of SDI; willingness to help anti-Communist “freedom fighters” around the globe;
renewed emphasis on Soviet violations of human rights; and a diplomacy focused more on public
opinion than on real negotiation.131 In March of 1983, during one of his most well-known speeches,
Reagan denounced the Soviet Union as “the focus of evil in the modern world.” He declared that the
Soviet leaders were “good Marxist-Leninists” who recognized “the only morality…that would
advance their cause is world revolution.”132
Following the strategic direction of his policy, Reagan was unusually distant from the daily
implementations of it. He was not fully aware of foreign and even domestic politics relying heavily
on his advisors. For example, he could not believe a reporter at a news conference who informed
Reagan that the United States had become the world’s greatest debtor nation under his rule.133 Such
ignorance of simple facts and reliance on presumptions did not contribute towards a better dialog
with the USSR. As L. Garthoff put it, Reagan’s policy “was too gratuitously hostile to serve usefully
in an effective competition.”134
In order to better understand the roles played by Reagan and Gorbachev, one has to be
aware of the ideological context of their personalities. The Cold War and its ideology had
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destructive effects on both the American image in international arena and the values of human rights
and democracy. The division of the world into a communist Evil Empire controlled by Moscow and
a Free World led by Washington D.C. allowed American policymakers to support numerous
antidemocratic regimes all over the globe. As long as their corrupt and authoritarian leaders declared
themselves anti-communists, they were promoted into the members of the Free World. Besides
massive loss of lives and enormous military investments during the Vietnam conflict, the Cold War
ideology justified assassination plots, negotiations with war lords, drug dealers, and even
terrorists.135
This is not to say that the Soviet Union was never engaged in similar deeds. Akin to the
U.S., USSR also hoped to expand its geopolitical and ideological influence by participating in proxy
wars all over the world. Some dictatorial leaders (in Somalia and Ethiopia, for example), who
cynically proclaimed themselves “marxist” or “socialist,” became the recipients of the Soviet aid
and support. Some liberation movements, who chose to join the socialist bloc, included elements of
terrorism.136
The prolonged geopolitical fight, left many victims in its wake and brought up a few
generations of people who were taught to always fight and be suspicious of their ideological enemy.
For decades, the two super-powers were governed by people who knew no other foreign policy
except the policy of the Cold War. When Ronald Reagan came to the White House in 1981, he was
not an exception. His blistering anti-Soviet rhetoric directed against closed-minded aged Soviet
leaders did not contribute to any sort of productive cooperation between the two countries in the
early 1980s.
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The situation changed dramatically after 1985, with the new Soviet leader who was able to
reassess the reality in a new way, and was ready to adapt domestic and foreign policies to this new
perception. Gorbachev’s new thinking led to the destruction of the Berlin Wall by the end of 1989.
Divided Europe had been the symbol of the ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the
two blocs since the end of the World War II. Once this division was over, international politics had
no chance to remain the same. The consequential changes were so significant that even the most
devoted cold warriors in the West had to recognize that the Cold War had ended.137
Reagan did not have a chance to continue the peacemaking process, as he had to leave
office in 1989. His successor, George Bush the elder, continued contributing to the peaceful solution
of the conflict. Once he became the president, he used advanced diplomatic skills to coax the Soviet
Union towards worldwide surrender. The atmosphere of the Malta summit favored the relationship
of confidentiality between Bush and Gorbachev. They developed mutual trust and could discuss
things privately without disclosing everything to public. At the summit, Bush convinced Mikhail
that if he withdrew Soviet forces around the world and reformed his society, the United States would
not see it as weakness of the USSR or take advantage of it. Bush’s influence was skillful enough not
to cause defensive reaction from the Soviet leadership. It also allowed Gorbachev to save face by the
end of the arms race. Bush’s diplomacy facilitated the end of the Cold War to a large extent.138
Neither Reagan nor Gorbachev used the word “victory” while talking about the end of the
Cold War. Both of them did not wish to open discussions about “the winner” in order to avoid
possible tensions. G. Bush was the first one to claim that the United States won the War. In August
1992, Bush began his speech in Houston with a hymn to himself as the hero of the end of the Cold
War:
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I saw the chance to rid our children’s dreams of the nuclear nightmare,
and I did… Germany is united, and a slab of the Berlin Wall sits right outside this
Astrodome… The Soviet Union can only be found in history books. The captive
nations of Eastern Europe and the Baltics are captive no more…This convention
is the first at which an American president can say, “The Cold War is over, and
freedom finished first!”139

Later, Bill Clinton ironically compared Bush who claimed to have ended the Cold War, to a
rooster who takes credit for the dawn.140
Most likely, back in 1992, Bush’s overstated speech was the president’s tool for the coming
elections. But it also brought about the discussion about winners and losers of the Cold War.
Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense in 1981-1987, said in an interview on
October 20th, 1998:

We were able to sustain a major peacetime build up for about five years,
which was longer than had ever happened in our history, and which gave us the
necessary strength so that Gorbachev, whose I think only real contribution to the
Cold War was recognizing that they couldn’t win a war, recognized that and then
began to change his rhetoric. I don’t think he ever changed his philosophy. He
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talked a lot about perestroika, glasnost, all of those things, but he never really
changed.141

Such opinion is in sharp contrast to the analyses by Jack Matlock and George Shultz.
Matlock, who worked for the national Security Council in Washington from 1983 until 1986 and
then became the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, knew more than anybody about the way Soviet
politics worked on the ground. Shultz saw the evolution in the thinking of Soviet key players having
discussions with Gorbachev and Shevarnadze. Matlock does not support the myth that Ronald
Reagan “brought the Soviet Union to its knees” and left Gorbachev with no alternative except to
recognize the independence of Eastern Europe, reduce arms, and end the Cold War. Like Shultz,
Matlock notes that Reagan wished to negotiate from strength, but he did wish to negotiate. The
president was willing to “engage with the Soviet Union in negotiations which protect and enhance
U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.”142
According to Matlock, Reagan “was in favor of bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union, but
his objective was to induce the Soviet leaders to negotiate reasonable agreements, not to break up
the country.”143 It was very important that Reagan, in the final analysis on US-Soviet relations,
preferred the advice of Secretary of State George Shultz to that of Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey. Weinberger and Casey had “more elaborate schemas
of the Soviet Union” and considered Gorbachev’s new thinking policy in international arena as
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“clever and duplicitous” strategy designed to “weaken the West by appealing to the antiwar
sentiments of European and American public opinion.”144

Boris Yeltsin, the first president of post-communist Russia, had a tendency to portray
Gorbachev as only a very partially reconstructed Communist. Presenting himself as a real democrat
and better friend of the West, Yeltsin firmly captured the political space created by Gorbachev’s
perestroika.145 Mikhail had the ability to see the absurdity of the old system and enough courage to
begin tearing it down. But when it was time to finally replace it, he wavered. Boris was more willing
to follow the course of the reforms Gorbachev had begun.146
Yeltsin built his tremendous popularity in the early ‘90s campaigning for greater equality,
market democracy, opposing corruption and the use of military forces against secessionist
movements. However, during his almost eight years of presidency he tolerated quite different things.
He favored the creation and indulgence of plutocratic elite, growing levels of political corruption,
ignorance of widespread social misery, malfunction of the political system, and the wanton military
invasion in the republic of Chechnya.147 Unfortunately for Russia, Yeltsin’s duplicity in many
important aspects became clear much later.
In contrast to Yeltsin, Gorbachev was committed to his rhetoric of a peaceful management
of the reformation at home and abroad. Being naturally averse to any use of force, he did not allow
bloodshed even at the cost of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and of the USSR itself.
Gorbachev also rejected both free capitalism and abolition of the Communist Party, even though this
decision cost him his political career.
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GORBACHEV’S PERSONALITY
People who used to work with Gorbachev admire his high sense of morality most of all. His
ethical positions and aversion to the traditions of Soviet leadership, combined with his romanticism
and idealism, caused him to play a unique historical role. On an international level, those traits
helped him not only to build trust with other leaders and end the Cold War, but also contributed to
the future more peaceful image of the country. At the same time, this idealism and a too optimistic
point of view doomed his domestic reforms to failure. Gorbachev’s unrealistic belief in his ability to
reform socialism and the Communist Party without changing the whole system is considered by
historians one of his major mistakes.
Another of Mikhail Gorbachev’s important characteristics, recognized by both his friends
and opponents, is his inability to make risky but necessary decisions and affect them sequentially.
As famous political journalist and activist Egor Gaydar noted, Gorbachev was very good in the
proposal of innovative ideas and always tried to reach a consensus. Many times he ended up with
quasi-decisions while the situation in the country demanded more firm and unambiguous actions.148
Chronic inconsistency and a lack of any kind of strategy affected the process of perestroika most of
all and caused what many would call a fiasco.
Except for “unpredictability,” Gorbachev’s favorite expressions were “the processes have
started,” “life will show,” and “history will judge.” A gifted orator and professional lawyer, Mikhail
was excellent in public speaking using interesting words to express his many ideas, but if a situation
required fast and crucial decisions, he usually preferred to wait until the “processes” would finish
their job and “life would show.”
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Gorbachev’s leadership style can be characterized as collegial. It was typical for the Soviet
leader to open major questions for discussion with his team and to share responsibility for decisions
with the group of advisors. He used democratic means, giving his people the right to freely express
their opinions and involving them in group problem solving. His wife Raisa played the role of his
special political and personal advisor until the day she passed away in September 1999. Despite his
faults as a leader, Mikhail Gorbachev is a good example of how to remain idealistic and not to lose
personal dignity in the world of high politics.

Nowadays, Mikhail Gorbachev is still active in political and social life. In 1992, he became
the President of the Gorbachev Foundation, known as the International Foundation for SocioEconomic and Political Studies, a non-profit educational organization. Since 1993, Gorbachev has
been the President of the environmental fund, Green Cross International, with branches in more than
twenty countries. He is a prolific writer, the winner of many various awards from all over the world,
and the holder of academic ranks of honor from a solid number of international universities.

The evaluation of Gorbachev as a leader remains highly controversial and depends on when
and where such evaluation was made. In Russia public opinion about Gorbachev has changed
significantly over the past two decades. In a survey conducted in December 1989, respondents were
asked to name the ten greatest people of all times and nations. Gorbachev was fourth in this rating
with 22.6 per cent, following only Lenin (68 per cent), Karl Marx (36 per cent), and Peter the Great
(about 32 per cent).149 During the ‘90s, when Yeltsin’s disappointing regime was seen by many
Russians as the direct consequence of perestroika, Gorbachev’s rating fell rapidly.
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In the year of 2000, another public opinion poll asked Russian citizens to name the most
outstanding politician of all who have led the country in the twentieth century. Stalin topped the list
(with 19 per cent), followed by Lenin (16 per cent). Gorbachev was sixth among the most
outstanding leaders of Russia with 7 per cent of the vote. However, among respondents with higher
education, Gorbachev and Stalin had equal support (14 per cent), and Mikhail was only one
percentage point behind Lenin (15 per cent).150
The majority of the former Soviet Union population blames Gorbachev and perestroika for
the collapse of the country. In 2005, another survey showed that 66 per cent of the Russians
regretted the breakup of the USSR, and only 23 per cent had no regrets. About 57 per cent of the
respondents thought the collapse of the Soviet Union was avoidable, and 34 per cent said it was
inevitable.151
In the West, however, Gorbachev’s achievements have extremely high grades. A Harris
poll in 2006 found that “59 per cent of respondents in the European Union still consider Mikhail
Gorbachev the best Soviet/Russian leader in the past twenty years.” Boris Yeltsin was named by
only 4 per cent of the respondents, while Vladimir Putin scored 12 per cent.152
The contrast between Russian and Western opinions about Gorbachev could also be clearly
seen in March of 2011 when the former Soviet leader celebrated his 80th anniversary. There were
two ceremonies: one in Moscow and one in London. In Moscow Gorbachev received the Order of
St. Andrew, a belated tribute from his country for his service as the last Soviet leader. During the
award ceremony in the Kremlin, President Dmitri Medvedev recognized that governing the Soviet

150

Brown, 2007, p. 326.

151

Ibid., 327.

152

Ibid., 327.

Union during a “very complex, dramatic period” was a tough job. “It can be assessed differently but
it was a heavy load,” Medvedev said.153
In Russia, Gorbachev gathered with his close friends and family only, and three weeks later
there was a glitzy gala in Great Britain. The London Royal Albert Hall hosted a charity event where
the list of VIP guests included famous Hollywood stars (including Sharon Stone, Kevin Spacey,
Goldie Hawn), actor and politician Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Polish President Lech Walesa,
Israeli President Shimon Peres, CNN founder Ted Turner, and many others. Outstanding Russian
and Western performers, including the London Symphony Orchestra, Shirley Bassey, and the
Scorpions, paid their tribute to Gorbachev at the event. All proceeds from the concert were shared
between the Gorbachev Foundation and the Raisa Foundation named after his wife who died from
cancer.154
The contrast between the two ceremonies clearly reflects the opposite views on
Gorbachev’s place in history in Russia and the West.
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CONCLUSION
Mikhail Gorbachev grew up as a typical product of Lenin-Stalin system. Being its active
supporter and wishing to improve it, he was the one who tore the system down. Drastic reforms
within the Soviet Union entailed changes in the international climate and resulted in the end of the
Cold War.
Describing Gorbachev’s early political career, one can say that he was in the right place, in
the right time. Brezhnev’s epoch of stagnation, three Secretary Generals dying in less than four
years one after another, and the serious need for a socio-economic reformation favored the election
of young, energetic Gorbachev in 1985. By that time, Gorbachev already had realized that
something was wrong with Soviet socialism and the country needed serious changes.
Mikhail launched his course of fundamental reforms aiming to make the Soviet Union a
more human and acceptable member of the world community. While criticizing Stalin’s personality
cult, Mikhail had created his own cult of reforms, promoting perestroika and glasnost. He used the
power of this cult to reduce the authority of the Communist party and the Moscow apparatus. Very
soon it became clear that the process of perestroika was hardly reversible even in case of
Gorbachev’s sudden death or resignation. As Condoleezza Rice noted back then, “It would be hard
for anyone who replaced Gorbachev to put all that back into the bottle.”155
The Chernobyl tragedy in 1986 was a terrifying reminder that any sort of nuclear attack
might destroy the whole human society. The consequences of the Chernobyl disaster indicated the
need for glasnost and precipitated Gorbachev’s decision of arms control and disarmament.
Domestic economic and social reforms were inconsistent and lacked a thought-out strategy.
The anti-alcohol campaign became a famous failure. Long lines in stores and shortage of basic
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goods were the main reason of mass criticism that people could express publicly thanks to the new
policy of openness.
Abroad, however, Gorbachev’s popularity turned into a phenomenon of Gorbymania.
Regular meetings with the United States leadership, speeches about human rights and need for
disarmament, signing of peacemaking treaties with Reagan made Gorbachev a real hero for
thousands of people in the West. In the United States and Western Europe people cheered on streets
when Gorbchev’s motorcade was passing by. His outstanding international reforms culminated in
1989 when the Berlin Wall fell and Germany became united again. Decline of the Communist
regime in Eastern Europe made it clear that the Cold War had lost its meaning. After the Malta
summit in December of 1989, Gorbachev and George Bush announced that the two countries
opened “a period of genuine cooperation.” The Cold War entered its very short final stage.
Having no more fear to be prosecuted and no more faith in communism, the Soviet
republics began the so-called parade of independence that led to the collapse of the USSR and
Gorbachev’s resignation in late 1991.
As his former advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev noted, “Gorbachev was not a great person, but
he performed a great mission liberating Russians from a totalitarian communist regime which is
more important for history.”156
Despite the wide range of view points, Gorbachev has definitely occupied a unique place in
both Russian and the world history and will always be remembered for contributing more than any
other politician on either side in ending the Cold War.
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